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THE USES OF HISTORY IN THE SUPREME COURT'S TAKINGS
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
JONATHAN LAHN*

Supreme Court Justices have, in their analyses of Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause 1 cases, frequently made a conscious choice to frame their
arguments in a broad historical context. 2 These uses of history fall into two
distinguishable categories, two discourses on history characterized by conflict both in the content of their historical arguments and in the purposes for
which they are deployed. One discourse emphasizes history as dynamic,
productive of change in the material conditions of society as well in the
realm of normative values and interests. In this discourse, changes in societal conditions over time explain the need for, and ultimately justify, governmental action upon private property pursuant to legislatively determined
public goals. A second, more recent discourse uses history as a means to
identify an original normative understanding of the relationship between
government and private property in which private property is viewed as
sacrosanct and largely immune from government interference. This discourse argues that these values, by virtue of their historical provenance in
early America, should control the application of Constitutional limits on
government interference with private property and preempt economic or
normative arguments that would lead to a result that violates the claimed
historical norm.
This essay begins by examining a group of significant Supreme Court
cases that implicate constitutional limitations on governmental power over
private property generally, and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007; B.A., English, Northwestern University,
2003. 1 would like to thank Professors Dan Hamilton, Michael Scodro, and Sarah Harding for their
advice and encouragement, Luke Shannon and Katie Vikingstad for their tireless editorial efforts, and
Daria Kozicki for giving me the opportunity to do this work and a reason to do it.
1. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, in relevant part, "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. This position is in contrast to the views of Professors Treanor and Epstein, who have both
argued that historical arguments have not played a significant part in Takings Clause jurisprudence. See
RICHARD A.

EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

29

(1985); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 803-04 (1995). 1 will argue that history-conscious arguments have
played an important role in significant Takings Clause cases, and I will take issue with the historical
inaccuracy of these arguments.
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specifically. This essay identifies in these cases the two distinct discourses
on history sketched out above. It then argues that the more recent discourse
on history in the Supreme Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence is essentially ahistorical, a caricature of the rich and complex history of the relationship between private property and governmental power. Moving
beyond the historical inaccuracy of this discourse, this essay argues that it
has dangerous implications, both for the Court's ability to fulfill its responsibilities as the paramount interpreter of American constitutional law, and
for society's ability to understand and define itself in relation to its legalhistorical past. Because of these dangers, this essay contends that the recent
discourse on history in the Supreme Court's Takings Clause cases, which
reduces a complex history to a set of static norms, must be vigorously challenged by lawyers, academics, and judges alike.
I.

THE USES OF HISTORY IN SUPREME COURT TAKINGS CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE

As an initial matter, I define "the use of history" as meaning reference
to trends and events occurring over time that are extrinsic to the specific
facts implicated in the particular case before the Court. Until the 1990s, the
Court used history in its Takings Clause jurisprudence to illustrate changes
in society over time, both in material conditions and in societal norms and
values. 3 In the Court's traditional historical discourse on takings, changes
in material conditions on the ground, new societal values, and shifts in the
preference society accords to different interests justify novel forms of governmental intervention in the realm of private property interests. 4 This discourse respects the role of state legislatures in recognizing societal change. 5
Because of this, the Court takes a deferential posture with respect to the
states' power to shape the contours of what it means to have rights in prop-

3. This is not to say that historical awareness has played a part in all significant Takings Clause
cases. For example, the Court's opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), a
seminal takings case, is devoid of references to extrinsic historical trends or events. The same is true for
the more recent Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (defining the constitutional limits on
exactions required by local government in exchange for zoning variances), and its logical antecedent,
Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastalCommission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
4. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). These
cases are discussed in more detail below. See infra text accompanying notes 14-46.
5. Each of these cases deals with legislative enactments by state governments or local govemments that exercise power devolved unto them by the state. See Midkiff 467 U.S. at 233; Penn Cent.
Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 108-09; Euclid, 272 U.S. at 379-80.
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erty and the states' ability to identify situations where governmental action
6
on private property is desirable and legitimate.
While this discourse remains a part the Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence, a fundamental shift occurred in the 1992 case of Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.7 For the first time, a majority of the Court mobilized historical arguments not for the purpose of illustrating societal
change, but rather to argue for the existence of a historical norm embraced
by early American society. 8 A majority of the Court held that this norm
should transcend time and operate in the present to act as a limitation on
the scope of legitimate government intervention in the realm of private
property. 9 Until recently, one could view this approach as an isolated
anomaly. However, the Lucas discourse reemerged in the dissenting opinions of Justices O'Connor and Thomas in Kelo v. City of New London in
June 2005.0 In their dissents, these Justices, joined by Justice Scalia and
Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued that historical understandings at the time of
the Constitution's ratification and in early America should control the
Court's present-day Takings Clause interpretations."1 As in Lucas, the Kelo
dissenters use historical arguments to identify a norm that, by virtue of its
historical pedigree, becomes a transcendent "first principle" of American
society and more specifically of American constitutional law. 12
Thus the conflict between these two discourses on history and constitutional interpretation is again a live issue, and the time is ripe for an interrogation of the historical underpinnings of the more recent discourse, which
makes such strong historical claims about early American practices and
property ideology. This Section identifies the competing historical discourses and elaborates on their conceptual content.

6. In each of these cases, the Court upholds a significant legislative interference with private
property interests on the basis of the states' power to regulate for the public welfare. See Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104; Euclid, 272 U.S. 365.
7. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
8. Seeid. at 1027-28.
9. See id. By arguing in favor of adherence to the "historical compact" of the Takings Clause, the
Court in Lucas seems to advocate a jurisprudential approach in which subsequent changes in social and
material conditions should not be allowed to trump the values allegedly manifested in the Fifth
Amendment.
10. 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
11. See id. at 2671, 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2680-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
12. See id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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The Dynamic Use of History as Justificationfor State Intervention
with PrivateProperty

Three major Supreme Court cases illustrate the Court's traditional use
of history to develop a theme of societal change over time as a justification
for novel forms of regulation or other interventions in the realm of private
property. 13 A good starting point is the celebrated 1926 case Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 14 In Euclid, an owner of unimproved land
challenged a municipality's zoning regulations on the grounds that the
regulations violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and
amounted to an arbitrary exercise of governmental power to deprive him of
the right to develop his property as he wished. 15 A majority of the Court, in
upholding the municipal regulations as a valid exercise of the police
power, 16 chooses to provide a historical context for its landmark decision,
which it recognizes as a deviation from traditional doctrine.
Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority, explained:
Building zone laws are of modem origin. They began in this country
about 25 years ago. Until recent years, urban life was comparatively
simple; but, with the great increase and concentration of population,
problems have developed, and constantly are developing, which require,
and will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use
and occupation of private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the
wisdom, necessity, and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century
ago, or even half a century
ago, probably would have been rejected as
17
arbitrary and oppressive.

13. Although three cases may appear to be a deceptively small sample of the total number of
Supreme Court Takings Clause cases, each of the three cases is incredibly significant in the history of
the relationship between government power and private property rights. Euclid was the first case in
which the Supreme Court reviewed, and upheld, municipal zoning regulations, which have become a
nearly universal facet of American life. Penn Central, discussed in detail below, see infra text accompanying notes 23-32, recognized that local governments could regulate the use of private property even
to protect such intangible things as the historical and architectural significance of privately owned
buildings. Midkiff, also discussed in more detail below, see infra text accompanying notes 34-46, dealt
with perhaps the most radical state action on private property, upholding a state law that forced certain
owners of significant amounts of real estate to sell fee simple interests in the property to their tenants.
Consequently, I contend that it is not myopic to focus on these three cases because their great significance outweighs their small number.
14. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Although this is not, strictly speaking, a Takings Clause case, the crucial
issue present in many Takings Clause cases-the extent of state governments' power to regulate or
otherwise interfere with private property interests-is at the core of the case.
15. Id. at 384-85.
16. Id. at 397.
17. Id. at386-87.
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Here the Court chooses to go beyond the specific facts of the case at
hand to introduce an argument about a broader trend in society.18 The purpose of this historical reference is to illustrate societal changes over time:
urban life has changed from "simple" to complex; regulations of property
use are "now uniformly sustained" where once they would been rejected. 19
History, in this passage, illustrates the dynamism of societal conditions, and
consequently of the rules that govern property.
The Court's use of history in Euclid is also justificatory in that it uses
the historical changes it identifies to justify a departure from traditional
doctrine. Whereas the municipal ordinances once would have been considered invalid, the Court, in light of present conditions, is willing to sustain
them. 20 Justice Sutherland makes this explicit when he writes that "while
the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their
application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a
changing world it is impossible that it should be otherwise."' 2 1 The historical dynamic the Court articulates to contextualize the controversy also

18. Later in the opinion, the Court recites further arguments for the desirability of zoning regulations that are predicated on a growing concern for the quality of urban life in America:
The matter of zoning has received much attention at the hands of commissions and experts,
and the results of their investigations have been set forth in comprehensive reports. These reports, which bear every evidence of painstaking consideration, concur in the view that the
segregation of residential, business and industrial buildings will make it easier to provide fire
apparatus suitable for the character and intensity of the development in each section; that it
will increase the safety and security of home life, greatly tend to prevent street accidents, especially to children, by reducing the traffic and resulting confusion in residential sections, decrease noise and other conditions which produce or intensify nervous disorders, preserve a
more favorable environment in which to rear children, etc. With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that the development of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the coming of apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in destroying the
entire section for private house purposes; that in such sections very often the apartment house
is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive
surroundings created by the residential character of the district. Moreover, the coming of one
apartment house is followed by others, interfering by their height and bulk with the free circulation of air and monopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the
smaller homes, and bringing, as their necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident to increased traffic and business, and the occupation, by means of moving and parked
automobiles, of larger portions of the streets, thus detracting from their safety and depriving
children of the privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in more favored
localities-until, finally, the residential character of the neighborhood and its desirability as a
place of detached residences are utterly destroyed. Under these circumstances, apartment
houses, which in a different environment would be not only entirely unobjectionable but
highly desirable, come very near to being nuisances.
Id. at 394-95.
19. Id.
at386-87.
20. See id. at 386-87, 397.
21. Id.
at387.
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serves as a justification for the Court's upholding the ordinances: the Court
22
is bringing property doctrine in line with changed circumstances.
The Court took a similar tack in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York, another landmark case dealing with zoning regulations
and Takings Clause issues. 2 3 At issue in Penn Central was a landmarkpreservation law enacted in New York City that imposed significant restrictions on the ability of the owners of specific landmark buildings to alter the
buildings' properties in a variety of ways. 24 At the outset of his opinion for
the Court, Justice Brennan writes that
[o]ver the past 50 years, all 50 States and over 500 municipalities have
enacted laws to encourage or require the preservation of buildings and
areas with historic or aesthetic importance. These nationwide legislative
efforts have been precipitated by two concerns. The first is the recognition that, in recent years, large numbers of historic structures ... have
been destroyed .... The second is a widely shared belief that structures
with special historic,2 5cultural, or architectural significance enhance the
quality of life for all.

The Court's opinion in Penn Central is in many ways the analogue of
its opinion over fifty years earlier in Euclid.26 As in Euclid, the analysis
begins with a historical claim about changes in society over time that is
designed to contextualize all that follows.

27

Just as in Euclid, where the

Court makes a claim about the increasing complexity of urban living conditions, 28 the Court in Penn Central claims that historic structures have

started to be destroyed while a belief in the value of such structures to soci29
ety at large has emerged.
Furthermore, as in Euclid, this historical claim becomes one justification for the Court's decision to uphold the ordinance, this time against a
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause challenge. The appellants had argued

that the landmark ordinance effected an unconstitutional taking in part be-

22. It is interesting to note that the Court seems somewhat uncomfortable with making what was,
in reality, a significant doctrinal shift. This is exemplified by the mysterious statement that "while the
meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract." Id. It is far from clear that the distinction between the unchanged "meaning" and the changing
"scope of application" has any practical significance, because only when the meaning is applied to facts
does the constitutional guarantee become operative.
23. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
24. See id. at 109-15.
25. Id. at 107-08.
26. Indeed, the Court's opinion in Penn Central cites the zoning laws upheld in Euclid as the
"classic example" of state police power trumping private property interests. Id. at 125. In all, Euclid is
referenced four times in the opinion. See id. at 125, 131, 134-35.
27. Seeid.at 107-08.
28. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
29. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 107-08.
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cause, unlike zoning ordinances, it targeted their structure specifically and
placed the burden of a public benefit on their shoulders uniquely. 30 In response, Justice Brennan argues that placing the cost of a public benefit on a
discrete set of individuals-the owners of New York City landmarks-is
not unconstitutional because it is "reasonably related to the implementation
of a policy.., expected to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property."3 1 While the connection is not
made explicit in the opinion, this determination is contingent on the historical claim discussed above.
Justice Brennan's argument that the ordinance applies to "all similarly
situated property" is predicated on the existence of the category of "property possessing historical or landmark significance," the emergence of
which is established by the historical argument at the beginning of the
opinion. 32 In other words, in order to accept the argument that the regulation is constitutional because it applies to all property that has special value
to the community as a historical landmark, we must accept that such a
value exists in the first place. Therefore, Justice Brennan's historical claim
about the emergence of a class of property with historical or aesthetic value
is essential to the Court's ultimate conclusion. The historical argument here
serves the same dual purpose as in Euclid:3 3 to illustrate change in a dynamic society, and to justify the Court's ultimate holding.
3 4 presents a fascinating instance
Hawaii Housing Authority v. MidkifJ
in which the Court employs history in a dynamic sense to contextualize and
legitimate its holding while at the same time maintaining that it is consistent with a precedent as old as the United States itself. In Midkiff the Court
was called upon to decide on the constitutionality of an enactment by the
state of Hawaii that provided that the state could condemn the property of
certain large landowners and transfer the fee interest in that property to
tenants holding leases on that land. 35 At issue was whether this exercise of
the eminent domain power was in pursuance of a "public use" as required
by the Takings Clause. 36
Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, begins her analysis
with a brief description of Hawaiian property history and its ramifica-

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 133.
Id. at 134 n.30 (emphasis added).
See id. at 107-08.
See 272 U.S. at 386-87, 394.
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Id. at 233.
Id.
at231-32.
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tions. 37 Reaching back to the initial settlement of the islands by Polynesian
immigrants from the western Pacific, she describes an essentially feudal
land tenure system in which title to all property was essentially vested in
"one island high chief, the ali'i nui." 3 8 She then writes that "beginning in
the early 1800's, Hawaiian leaders and American settlers repeatedly attempted to divide the lands of the kingdom," but "[t]hese efforts proved
largely unsuccessful." 39 As a result of the persistence of traditional customs
in the face of attempts to divide land ownership, "[i]n the mid-1960's...
the Hawaii Legislature discovered that ... 47% [of the land] was in the
'40
hands of only 72 private landowners.
While this historical account presents a picture of a largely unchanged
system of concentrated land ownership, it also presents a dynamic aspecta desire dating back to the early 1800s on the part of Hawaiians and
American settlers alike to alter the traditional system and promote the diffusion of property ownership. 4 1 Whereas Euclid and Penn Central emphasize actual societal change over time, in Midkiff the Court emphasizes a
persistent stability and the long-term frustration of change. 42 The Court
also employs a historical discourse to legitimate that desire for change, as
O'Connor writes that "[t]he people of Hawaii have attempted, much as the
settlers of the original 13 Colonies did, to reduce the perceived social and
'43
economic evils of a land oligopoly traceable to their monarchs.
The Court goes on to uphold the act as compliant with the Fifth
Amendment's requirement that a taking of property be in pursuance of a
public use, even though the direct effect of the act was to take title to real
property from certain individuals and transfer it to others. 44 It justifies this
non-obvious conclusion by deploying history. First, the historical argument-that an outdated system of land ownership persists even though it
has long since become undesirable to native and settler alike-argues for a
certain dynamic: an increasing desire for diffuse land ownership frustrated
by inertia in the system. Second, the historical references, both to the longheld but frustrated desire for change 4 5 and the analogy drawn to the values
of the Revolutionary generation, 4 6 are deployed in order to legitimate the
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See id. at 232.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at241-42.
See id. at 245.
See id. at 232.
See id. at 241-42.
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Court's holding that a forced transfer of title from one individual to another
can be constitutional in the proper context.
Between these cases, which cover roughly sixty years' worth of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the extent to which government can modify
or interfere with private interests in property within the boundaries of the
Fifth Amendment, there is enough regularity to identify a loose but nonetheless coherent discourse. In each case, the Court chooses to make claims
that are historical in nature, beyond what is required to state the specific
facts of the case at hand.4 7 The content of these claims is the existence of
some dynamic of social change in the broader context within which the
specific controversy is situated. Furthermore, in each case the strategy underlying the Court's choice to "use" history is to contextualize and legitimate the reason for its choice to hold as it does. Based on these regularities
between the cases, we can identify a dynamic/justificatory use of history in
the Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence that was deployed in significant
decisions over the past eighty years.
B.

Static HistoricalNorms as Reason-PreemptingFirstPrinciples

In 1992, in Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council,48 a new histori-

cal discourse emerged in the majority opinion by Justice Scalia. The majority's use of history in Lucas is in many ways diametrically opposed to the
preexisting discourse identified in the previous Section. As employed in
Lucas, historical arguments are marshaled to establish a static baseline of
normative values, existing at some time in the past, that do not change with
time. 49 Furthermore, these norms operate today to militate against governmental interference with, or regulation of, private property interests that
cannot be squared with the putative historical understanding of the relationship between government and private property.50 The discourse that
emerged in Lucas emphasizes history as a place in which static first principles are waiting to be discovered, and argues that by virtue of their historical pedigree they preempt any discussion of the policy justifications

47. See id. at 231-32; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 107-08 (1978);
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
48. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
49. As Gregory S. Alexander describes it, "In his opinion for the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia
relied on the supposed existence of a singular American tradition concerning the protection of private
property."

GREGORY

S.

ALEXANDER,

COMMODITY

AND

PROPRIETY:

COMPETING

VISIONS

OF

PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 7 (1997).

50. The emphasis in the Court's opinion, as I will discuss in the following pages, is on evaluating
present-day government interaction with private property in light of the "historical compact" of the
Takings Clause that lives on in American "constitutional culture." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028.
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underlying governmental action which appear to transgress them. 51 If the
nature of historical discourse in the Court's previous Takings Clause cases
was "dynamic" and its purpose was "justificatory," the newer discourse
may be seen as emphasizing a "static" form of history and employing it for
"reason-preemptive" purposes. 52
In Lucas, the Court was called upon to determine whether a taking of
property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment had
occurred when a South Carolina enactment, designed to protect coastal
ecosystems, had the effect of prohibiting Mr. Lucas from building anything
on two parcels of land he had purchased for the purpose of residential development. 53 In holding that a taking that would require compensation
under the Fifth Amendment had occurred, the Court was not required to
reach very far for novel arguments. Indeed, the majority opinion makes it
clear that there was ample support in the Court's precedents for such a
finding: "[a]s we have said on numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment
is violated when land-use regulation 'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land."'' 54 With such a body of case law 55 supporting both the proposition
that a regulation that deprives a private property owner of all economic use
of her land is a taking, and the finding that the regulation prevented Lucas
from making any economic use of his property, the Court could easily have
ended its analysis.
Rather than stopping here, however, Justice Scalia writes that "[w]e
have never set forth the justification for this. rule," and elects to undertake a
thorough explanation of the underpinnings of the rule that a regulation that
deprives the property owner of all economically beneficial use effects a
taking. 56 The Lucas opinion dismisses the notion that competing policy
concerns manifesting themselves in the legislative process-precisely the
51. The Court's mistrust in Lucas of legislative policy determinations about the use of private
property is highlighted by the passage, discussed below, in which the Court rejects the notion that
preventing a "noxious use" does not constitute a "taking," on the grounds that the determination of what
is a "noxious use" cannot be made on an "objective, value-free basis." Id. at 1026.
52. 1 use the term "reason-preemptive" to describe a normative belief or commitment that prevents
the holder of the belief from weighing arguments that would cause her to act contrary to that belief. For
a discussion and critique of "reason-preemption" and normative commitments, see Richard Warner,
Rights, Rationality, and the Preemption of Reasons, 79 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1091, 1097-99 (2004).
53. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007-09.
54. Id. at 1016 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
55. In addition to Agins, the Court supports its categorical rule on regulations depriving the private
property owner of all economically beneficial use of her property by reference to Nollan v. California
CoastalCommission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass 'n v,DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987), and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264 (1981). See
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16.
56. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.
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concerns that the older tradition of historical discourse in Takings Clause
cases highlighted--can be the basis for interpreting the extent of the Takings Clause's guarantees. 57 Rejecting the argument that a regulation depriving a property owner of economically viable use of her property does not
effect a taking when it prevents a "noxious use," Justice Scalia writes,
When it is understood... that the distinction between regulation
that "prevents harmful use" and that which "confers benefits" is difficult,
if not impossible, to discern on an objective, value-free basis[,] it becomes self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to
distinguish regulatory "takings"... from regulatory deprivations that do
not require compensation. Afortiori the legislature's recitation of a noxour categoriious-use justification cannot be the basis for departing from
58
cal rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated.
This argument must be recognized for what it is: a rejection of the notion that the limits of governmental power over private property should be
informed by policies and values understood in the context of a changing
society, 59 and an embrace of a categorical rule that finds its justification
somewhere other than in the nebulous and shifting world of contemporary
60
opinion.
In justifying his categorical rule on takings, Justice Scalia writes that
the Court's rule in Lucas-that the State "may resist compensation only if
the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows
that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with"-is
consistent with a tradition in the Court's Takings Clause cases of decisions
"guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and
the State's power over, the 'bundle of rights' that they acquire when they
obtain title to property." 6 1 In the same paragraph, he further develops this
theme of "understandings" held by the people: a rule that makes all private
interests in land subject to the "'implied limitation' that the State may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the
historicalcompact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of
'62
our constitutionalculture."

57. Id. at 1026.
58. Id.
59. This is precisely the opposite approach to that taken by the Court in Euclid and Penn Central,
in which the Court relied heavily on the significance of changed circumstances and attitudes in examining the validity of the challenged regulations. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 107-08 (1978); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
60. For an alternative discussion of the possible sources of this rule, see Frank 1.Michelman,
Property, Federalism,and Jurisprudence:A Comment on Lucas and JudicialConservatism, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 301, 318-24 (1993).

61. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
62. Id. at 1028 (emphases added).
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This line of argument shows the Court rejecting a mutable, policybased definition of the balance between governmental power and private
property that is influenced by a dynamic vision of history, and embracing a
new approach that would interpret the Constitution's limitations on governmental power over private property in light of the "understanding" expressed in a "historical compact" that forms the basis of a "constitutional
culture. '63 But what is the content of this "understanding," or the "historical compact" of the Takings Clause? With respect to Lucas's "total taking"
situation, Justice Scalia makes clear that he is referring to the common-law
doctrine of nuisance: "[A]s it would be required to do if it sought to restrain
Lucas in a common-law action for public nuisance, South Carolina must
identify background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit
the uses he now intends .... ,"64 In other words, the limits of governmental
power over private property-at least in the case of a regulation prohibiting
all economically viable use-are to be fixed by reference to an understanding, expressed in the "historical compact" of the Takings Clause, the content of which is defined by the background principles of the common law. 65
With this final piece in place, the Court in Lucas initiates a new discourse on history in its Takings Clause jurisprudence. The older discourse
discussed above employed a historical narrative to illustrate societal change
and to justify governmental intervention in private property based on emergent values and policy considerations. 66 In Lucas, history is used to argue
for a "compact" between the people and their government based on an "understanding" located sometime in the past, which does not change over
time but rather remains a yardstick for measuring the legitimacy and lawfulness of present-day governmental interventions in private property. 67
The historical understanding is the marker of the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate, between lawful and unlawful, and it preempts a discussion of competing interests and policies that is seen as too malleable to
form the basis of a constitutional guarantee. 68

63. See id.
64. Id. at 1031.
65. Thus the Court acknowledges that regulations depriving an owner of all economically valuable
use are not takings if they merely prohibit in positive-law form what was "always unlawful" because
the owner could have been enjoined from such use under the "background principles of nuisance and
property law." See id. at 1030.
66. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See
supra text accompanying notes 14-46.
67. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28.
68. See id. at 1026.
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Recently, this discursive tactic was adopted by the dissenting Justices
in Kelo v. City of New London.69 In Kelo, the Court upheld an exercise of
the eminent domain power by the city of New London, Connecticut, by
which the city condemned land belonging to private homeowners in order
to transfer it to a private development corporation for development as,
among other things, an office and research complex. 70 The Court found that
the city of New London's plan, which was intended to create benefits for
the public by increasing the city's tax base, was pursuant to a valid public
purpose and therefore not in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings
71
Clause.
The dissent by Justice O'Connor begins with the constitutional law
chestnut Calder v. Bull, quoting from that opinion that "[a]n ACT of the
legislature... contrary to the great first principles of the social compact,
cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority. ' 72 The
dissent continues, "Today the Court abandons this long-held, basic limitation on government power. '73 Later in the opinion, Justice O'Connor references both Alexander Hamilton 74 and James Madison, 75 ultimately
concluding that "the government now has license to transfer property from
those with fewer resources to those with more. The Founders cannot have
intended this perverse result. ' 76
Similarly, Justice Thomas's dissent begins, "Long ago, William
Blackstone wrote that 'the law of the land... postpone[s] even public necessity to the sacred and inviolable rights of private property.' The Framers
embodied that principle in the Constitution.... Defying this understanding,
the Court replaces the Public Use Clause with a 'Public Purpose'
Clause... .",77 Justice Thomas continues, "Our cases have strayed from the
Clause's original meaning .... -78 In support of his argument that the Fifth
Amendment allows the taking of private property "only if the public has a
right to employ it," Justice Thomas writes that "[t]he Constitution's com69. 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2671 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 2658-60, 2668 (majority opinion).
71. Id. at 2668.
72. Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388
(1798)).
73. Id.
74. "[The Fifth Amendment's requirements of 'public use' and 'just compensation'] serve to
protect 'the security of Property,' which Alexander Hamilton described to the Philadelphia Convention
as one of the 'great obj [ectsl of Gov[ernment]."' Id. at 2672 (citation omitted).
75. "'That alone is a just government,' wrote James Madison, 'which impartially secures to every
man, whatever is his own."' Id. at 2677 (citation omitted) (italics omitted).
76. Id.
77. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 2678.
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mon-law background reinforces this understanding," and he quotes Blackstone for the proposition that "[s]o great... is the regard of the law for
private property ...that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not
even for the general good of the whole community. ' 79 In the last prong of
his historical argument, Thomas writes that "[e]arly American eminent
domain practice largely bears out this understanding of the Public Use
Clause," and produces multiple examples of early American uses of the
eminent domain power that, he argues, illustrate that, in practice, early
Americans believed that eminent domain had to be justified by a public use
80
of condemned land.
Taken together, the two dissenting opinions are a continuation and an
elaboration of the historical discourse first employed by the Court in Lucas.
Where the Lucas Court refers somewhat vaguely to "background principles" and "understandings" made manifest in a "historical compact" that
became part of a "constitutional culture, ' 81 the dissents in Kelo fill out
these concepts with more definite meaning. The relevant time, according to
the Kelo dissents, is the time of the founding of the United States and
"early America."'82 The content of the background principles is an ideology
of private property as sacrosanct and largely off-limits to governmental
interference. 83 This understanding attains the level of one of the "first principles"' 84 of American society, and its function is reason-preemptive: if an
enactment falls outside its boundaries, it is automatically unjustifiable and
void. The combination of the historical arguments in Lucas and Kelo constitutes a fully-formed counter-discourse to the dynamic/justificatory historical discourse that had been prevalent in the Supreme Court's Takings
Clause cases. This newer discourse identifies normative values relating to
the intersection between government and private property and argues that,
by virtue of their historical positioning in a nascent American culture, these
values lose their historical contingency and become static "first principles"
that preempt policy or efficiency arguments that would lead to a result that
85
contradicts them.
79. Id. at 2680 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
80. Id. at 2681-82.
81. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992).
82. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
83. See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
84. See id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85. Justice O'Connor vehemently rejects the idea that a weighing of costs and benefits to the
public and the private property owner can be the touchstone for a legitimate exercise of eminent domain, writing that "[tihe specter of condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the
State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with
a factory" in the name of putting property to a higher economic use. Id. at 2676.

2006]

II.

HISTOR Y IN TAKINGS CLA USE JURISPRUDENCE
GOVERNMENTAL INTERFERENCE WITH AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE

PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA AND THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT

The constitutional limitations on governmental power over private
property espoused by the Court in Lucas and Kelo are premised on a normative claim based on a strong historical claim. The normative claim is that
the "original understanding" or "background principles" that the Framers
embodied in the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause should continue to
define the boundaries of governmental power today, notwithstanding
changes in material conditions or societal values. 86 The historical claim, as
I have shown above, is that in the early American understanding of private
property private interests in property were considered sacrosanct and
87
largely immune from governmental regulations or other interferences.
However, the historical record compels quite the opposite conclusion:
the history of Early America reveals that colonial and state governments
possessed enormous power to regulate and otherwise interfere with private
interests in property, and that they used this power frequently pursuant to
legislative determinations of the public welfare. 88 Both before and after the
ratification of the Constitution and the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the
states, like their colonial predecessors, regulated and used their eminent
domain powers broadly and deeply in a manner inconsistent with the putative Blackstonian "understanding" about the sanctity of private property. 89
The evidence suggests that private property rights were often subsumed to
the "police power" of the state to act in furtherance of the public welfare
and the promotion of economic development. 90

86. This normative claim is best illustrated by the Court's opinion in Lucas. Lucas emphasizes
that regulations on the use of private property (at least those which deny all economically beneficial
use) must be consistent with the commitment embodied in the "historical compact" of the Takings
Clause, which in turn requires that owners be compensated unless the prohibited use was already denied
to the owner by common law principles. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030. This normative claim also emerges in
the Kelo dissents, particularly in Justice O'Connor's argument that land use regulations must be evaluated in light of the "first principles of the social compact" as they existed at the time of the founding.
Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
87. See, e.g., Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2677-81 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028.
88. For the proposition that the regulatory activities of early American governments have been
vastly under-recognized, see WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996).

89. See discussion infra Part I.A.
90. As Professor Alexander has written, one important strand of early American property ideology
was "proprietarian"-based on the belief that "the primary purpose of property is to maintain the proper
social order," and requiring government regulation of property because "the market cannot be relied on
to create that order." ALEXANDER, supranote 49, at 9-10.
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Neither does the available historical record support Justice Scalia's
contention that the notion of nearly inviolable private property rights protected by categorical, judicially enforceable limits on state interference was
part of what he terms the "historical compact recorded in the Takings
Clause."'9 1 This line of argument contends that the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause represented a national commitment to the principles of
Blackstonian property, and that those principles-the right to use restricted
only by common law nuisance principles, 9 2 the privileging of private ownership claims over the needs of the community, 93 etc.-require us to apply
the same standard today.
This argument faces insurmountable historical difficulties. The history
of the amendment, as understood through the writings of its architect James
Madison, suggests that the Takings Clause was intended to achieve a narrow purpose: to prevent a legislative majority on the national level from
carrying out the wholesale destruction or redistribution of private property. 94 As William Michael Treanor has argued, nothing in the history of
the Takings Clause suggests that it was originally meant to impose any
kind of limitation on interferences short of total appropriation or destruction of property, or to define the legitimate purposes for the use of eminent
95
domain.
In rejecting the notion that the Takings Clause was originally understood as a powerful constraint on state power over property, I do not contend that governmental interference with private property interests was
completely unfettered by the Constitution. Certainly, the Framers were
motivated at least in part by a desire to protect property. As Jennifer Nedelsky has argued, in the Framers' view, "[o]nly the effective protection of
property from legislative infringement could prevent the instability that
would ultimately destroy the republic. '96 Yet, the history of constitutional
limits on state action upon private property shows that the constitutional
provision which was invoked to place a limit on governmental action vis-dvis private property was not the Takings Clause at all, but the Contracts
Clause. 97 In case after case where states acted in a way that was arguably

91.
92.
93.
94.

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028; see also discussion infra Part I.B.
See Lucas, at 1028, 1030.
See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2680 (2005).
See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS

OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-

TIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 25 (1990).

95. See Treanor, supra note 2, at 782.
NEDELSKY, supra note 94, at 27.
97. See discussion infra Part lI.B.2. The United States Constitution provides that no State may
pass any law "impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
96.
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better classified as a "taking" of property rather than an "impairment" of
the "obligation" of a contract, the Supreme Court elected to invoke the
Contracts Clause as the relevant limitation. 98
The final part of this Section will argue that the choice of the Framers
to make the Contracts Clause applicable to the states and the Takings
Clause applicable only to the federal government was not an accident. Nor
was the decision by the Marshall Court to make the Contracts Clause the
primary tool for protecting the rights of private property against state encroachment a coincidence. Rather, the choice reflects something fundamental about the distinction between rights in property and the rights created by
contract. The scope and content of the right to property were defined by the
states and subject to the limitation of the oft-exercised police and eminent
domain powers. 99 Consequently, the meaning of "property rights" was
impossible to define on a national level beyond a recognition that, whatever
the contours of private rights in property, a total destruction of or appropriation of those rights was a "taking." A federal protection against takings
that was limited to total takings did not necessitate a federal definition of
the specific interests that constituted property. Such a definition would be
impossible given the amorphous laws, traditions, and customs at the state
level, where property was defined.
By contrast, the Contracts Clause prevented the states from interfering
only with those rights created by and embodied in contracts.100 This was
not problematic to define at a federal level, because the rights and interests
that were protected were defined by a discrete, readily ascertainable set of
rules-the terms of specific contracts. By protecting private property under
the Contracts Clause, the Court was able to prevent state interference with
specific rights and expectations created by contracts without having to define the broader category of "property rights" applicable to the population
at large on a federal level.
In short, the Framers' decision to apply the Takings Clause to the federal government and the Contracts Clause to the states, and the Marshall
Court's decision to protect private property against state interference by
invoking the Contracts Clause rather than the Fifth Amendment, indicate
something significant and damaging to historical underpinning of the recent
static/preemptive historical discourse on takings: the early American un-

98. See, e.g., Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). These
cases are discussed in greater detail below. See infra text accompanying notes 176-87.
99. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
100. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; see also discussion infra Part l1.B.2.
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derstanding, embodied in the Constitution, was that states, and not the federal government, were responsible for defining-through custom and tradition, common law, and legislative determinations about the police and
eminent domain powers-the content of individual rights in property. Constitutional limits applied only to situations involving the total destruction or
appropriation of whatever interests an individual possessed subject to state
law-through the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment-or to state
interference with clearly defined rights and expectations defined through
the private "lawmaking" inherent in contracts through the Contracts
Clause.
In sum, although the Framers were concerned with creating a constitutional framework that would inhibit legislative interferences with private
property, the states left the bargaining table at which the Constitution and
Bill of Rights were hammered out with huge discretion to define, modify,
and otherwise intervene in the realm of private property. Property and its
attendant rights remained highly malleable concepts that could be-and
were-shaped by legislatively determined policy choices at the state level;
only the prohibition on measures that impaired specific contractually defined rights operated as a constitutional limitation on this process. The
"constitutional moment" was not a "Blackstonian moment" in which a rigid
substantive definition of the rights of private property was adopted as a
national norm.
A.

Government Power over PrivateProperty in Early American Practice

The notion of an early American tradition of private property as inviolable, or of private interests in property being largely outside the reach of
governmental power, is a crucial component of the static/preemptive historical discourse in Takings Clause cases. 10 1 This discourse argues that
there was an original understanding in American society that private property interests were of paramount importance and were not to be altered or
regulated simply to achieve the needs or goals of society identified through
the legislative process. 102 Whatever the normative appeal of this ideology
today, this essay shows that state regulation of and interference with private
property interests were pervasive in early American society from colonial
times well into the nineteenth century. Therefore, I argue, early American
practices provide no historical basis for the claim that a grudging approach
101. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2677-80 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992).
102. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028.
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to state power over private property can be justified by reference to an "understanding" present in late eighteenth or early nineteenth century American society.
1.

Colonial and Revolutionary Times

Colonial law and government was, unquestionably, influenced by both
the common law of England, which had a strong tradition of protecting
private property rights against governmental interference, and Lockean
philosophy, which emphasized that property rights are a natural, prepolitical attribute of human beings. 103 Nonetheless, conditions in America
were quite different from the conditions that obtained in England; in particular, land was abundant, but development and infrastructure were
needed. 104 As a result, Colonial lawmakers routinely implemented regulations that were intended to promote the public good by encouraging development of private land by removing or lessening the protection of interests
in undeveloped land. 105 Moreover, these regulations did not express a
solely economic preference for development over disuse. As Professor
John F. Hart has argued, they also "reflected ...a normative judgment that
failure to develop and use private land unreasonably harmed the commu06
nity."1
I will not undertake a detailed analysis of Colonial regulation and legislative interference with private property interests, which have been catalogued extensively by Professor Hart; 107 I will merely highlight them in
broad strokes. Colonial legislatures acted to encourage the improvement
and use of land. In Massachusetts, for example, a 1634 ordinance provided
that failure to build on or improve land within three years could result in
forfeiture of title, even if development was not a condition in the original
grant. 108 A similar ordinance in New Netherland in 1663 provided for forfeiture within six months of any lands that the owner did not "fence in and
improve."' 109 Taking a slightly different tack, the Virginia legislature enacted a statute in 1645 that provided for reassignment of improved lands
103. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 10 (2d ed. 1998) ("English common law provided the legal foundation
for property ownership in the colonies."); id. at 17 ("It is difficult to overstate the impact of the Lockean
concept of property.").
104. See id. at 10-25.
105. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significancefor Modern Takings Doctrine,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1259-63 (1996).
106. Id. at 1259.
107. See Hart, supra note 105.

108. Id. at 1260.
109. Id. at 1260-61.
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that had been "deserted" by their owners.1 10 These regulations show Colonial governments taking an active role in promoting development, not with
the "carrot" of subsidies, but with the "stick" of property forfeiture should
an owner fail to improve and utilize his property. This body of law allowing governmental interference with-or even termination of-a private
interest in land goes well beyond the default limit recognized by Blackstone and the static/preemptive discourse, which emphasizes private nuisance as the only relevant limitation on a private owner's right to use her
land. 11 These laws did not merely proscribe uses that were harmful to
other members of the community; these regulations sought to force owners
112
to act affirmatively to improve the material condition of the community.
Another exercise of Colonial governmental power over private property involved regulations that dictated the parameters within which private
owners could use their land. In 1635, the General Court of Massachusetts
Bay ordered that all homes in each town should be built within one-half
mile from the town meeting house. 113 Colonial legislatures also imposed
restrictions on buildings in urban areas for the purposes of public safety, or
for the general welfare, to ensure a pleasing and orderly appearance in the
towns. 1 14 Indeed, as Professor Hart has written, "The objectives of governance regarded as legitimate were not limited to preventing tangible
harms-the kind of physical injury to other people or property associated
with tort or nuisance doctrine."' 15
Aside from regulation, Colonial governments also exercised the eminent domain power, largely for major public improvements such as highways and public buildings. 1 6 In keeping with the pattern of broad
governmental power over private property, the colonies did not always
follow the Blackstonian maxim that government appropriation of private
lands required remuneration: "In the early years the colonies compiled a
checkered record with respect to the payment of compensation for land
taken for roads." 1 17 Aside from this spotty application of the English com110. Id. at 1262.
111. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2677-80 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028, 1030 (1992).
112. See Hart, supra note 105, at 1260-62. This tends to undermine Justice O'Connor's argument
in her dissent in Kelo that the American traditions embodied in the Takings Clause call for a line to be
drawn between acceptable regulations that address a property use that inflicts an "affirmative harm" on
society and unconstitutional laws that are intended merely to increase productivity or generate wealth.
See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
113. Hart, supra note 105, at 1273.
114. See id. at 1275-76.
115. Id. at 1281.
116. ELY, supra note 103, at 24.
117. Id.
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mon-law requirement of payment, the colonies often exercised the eminent
domain power pursuant to objectives that provided immediate, direct benefits for private individuals and incidental or secondary benefits to the public
at large. 118
The overall picture of the relationship between governmental power
and private property interests that emerges from these aspects of the colonial period suggests a broad range of legitimate government purposes for
interference with private property rights, ranging from economic development and public safety to less tangible goals such as aesthetic appeal." 19
Furthermore, the power of the government in its areas of legitimate interest
was great: colonies not only regulated, but also could bring about the forfeiture-sometimes compensated, sometimes not-of private property
pursuant to their various prerogatives. As Professor Ely writes, "[T]he
rights of property owners were not inviolate. Existing property arrangements were compelled to yield to the colony's social and economic needs.
Moreover, colonial legislators broadly defined the nature of the public purpose that justified the exercise of eminent domain." 120 Therefore, if there is
a historical basis for the putative American tradition of private property as
sacrosanct and largely immune to governmental interference, it is not the
practices of the Colonial legislatures in the 150 years preceding the American Revolution. 121

2.

The Early Nineteenth Century

We have seen that, in the Colonial period, government power over
private property interests was both broad, with a wide range of purposes or
goals that legitimated government intervention, and penetrating, because
the extent of government power went beyond regulation to divestiture of
property either through eminent domain or defeasance pursuant to statute.
118. See id. at 24-25.
119. This broad range of regulatory competence gives credence to the "proprietarian" ideology of
property that Professor Alexander has argued for in early America. See ALEXANDER, supra note 49, at
1-2. As Professor Novak has argued, albeit in reference to the nineteenth century rather than colonial
times, the breadth of the government's regulatory power suggests that regulation of private property
was viewed as "a moral exercise for the promotion of public happiness in the good society." William J.
Novak, Common Regulation: Legal Origins of State Power in America, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1061, 1083
(1994).
120. ELY, supra note 103, at 25.
121. Professor Treanor has written that "even originalists do not use history to interpret the Takings
Clause." Treanor, supra note 2, at 804, 1 believe that this statement is erroneous. See supra note 2.
However, to the extent that Professor Treanor means that the positions taken by the Court in cases such
as Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), are inconsistent with the earlyAmerican understanding of the private property/government interface, this is borne out by the facts. A
more precise assessment might be that even the originalists do not use accurate history to interpret the
Takings Clause.
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But the Revolutionary War, and particularly the ideologies that developed
in order to justify the Revolution, may have altered the relationship between private rights in property and government power in the period following the war and the ratification of the Constitution. This argument is
made by Professor Ely: "Influenced by the Whig political tradition as well
as English common law, colonial leaders assigned property rights an essential place in the evolution of revolutionary constitutionalism .... Accordingly, it was entirely logical that the right to property was among the
122
highest social values in the new republic."
If such an ideological shift had in fact taken place-if the rights of private property had emerged from the revolutionary/constitutional period
endowed with a stronger position relative to government power in early
American ideology-then we might expect that one result would be a diminished exercise of state power over private property interests in the early
nineteenth century. This would seem to be necessary if the early nineteenth
century were to serve as the temporal location of the popular "understanding" and "background principles" of sacrosanct private property and limited government intervention. However, the history of private property's
relationship to government power in the early nineteenth century does not
support this contention. Rather, the picture that emerges is one of pervasive
regulation and, beyond regulation, a widespread use of eminent domain
unrestricted by a strict definition of "public use."
In examining this period, two broad trends identified by prominent
historians provide a useful framework within which the relationship of
private property to governmental power can be understood. The first is
William J. Novak's articulation of the pervasive local and state regulation
of society that characterized the nineteenth century. 123 Novak marshals
copious evidence in support of his contention that, contrary to the conventional wisdom that the regulatory state is a relatively recent product of
modernity, "[a] distinctive and powerful governmental tradition devoted in
theory and practice to the vision of a well-regulated society dominated
United States social and economic policymaking from 1787 to 1877."124
The other broad trend is what Morton J. Horwitz has described as the
"emergence of an instrumental conception of law" in the early nineteenth
century. 12 5 Horwitz argues persuasively that

122. ELY, supra note 103, at 41.
123. See NOVAK, supra note 88.
124. Id. at 1.
125. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860, at 1-30
(1977).
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judges came to think of the common law as equally responsible with legislation for governing society and promoting socially desirable conduct.
The emphasis on law as an instrument of policy encouraged innovation
and allowed judges to formulate legal doctrine with the self-conscious
goal of bringing about social change.... American law stood on the
verge of...
one of the great creative outbursts of modem legal his126

tory.
Thus, we see two broad arguments: that nineteenth-century local and
state governments pervasively regulated for the general welfare, and that
law was increasingly viewed as an instrumentality for promoting social
change and desirable conduct. When combined, these arguments suggest
the reason why, rather than a retreat from governmental interference with
private property interests, we see an early nineteenth-century expansion of
state power over private property as regulation and law were used as instrumentalities of societal progress.
Two examples are particularly instructive. In the area of riparian property rights, Horwitz illustrates how state legislation, in the form of Mill
Acts, 127 was enacted to promote socially desirable economic behavior by
mill owners and how that legislation used law as a tool to minimize the cost
of compensating those whose property interests were damaged by this desirable activity. 128 These enactments sanctioned the invasion of private
property interests due to flooding and imposed limitations on the damages
paid to the injured property holder. 129 These facets of the legislation had
the effect of forcing the injured party to subsidize, through his loss in property value, the activity of the economically active party.130

126. Id. at 30 (internal quotations omitted).
127. Although they varied somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the essence of a Mill Act was
to statutorily limit the liability of a mill owner for damage to neighboring lands caused when water
backing up from a mill dam spilled onto neighboring property. See id. at 48.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. For another point of view on the Mill Acts, see EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 170-75.
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These acts, which were adopted widely in the states and territories, 13 1
illustrate the interconnectedness of the trends that Novak and Horwitz have
identified in nineteenth-century society. They represent, drawing on Novak's theory, positive action by state legislatures upon private property to
132
promote the general welfare and bring about a "well-regulated society."'
The method by which they achieved this was what Horwitz has termed the
instrumental use of the law, allocating rights and liabilities in a way that
would bring about desirable behavior. 133 While the states that enacted such
legislation did not directly appropriate private property for the benefit of
mill owners, they did put in place a legal framework that altered the respective rights of property owners through augmenting the rights of the mill
owner by lowering the legal and economic barriers to his flooding of
neighboring property, and diminishing those of neighboring owners by
making damages the exclusive remedy while at the same time imposing
limits on the compensation to be paid. 13 4 This redistribution, moreover,
was linked only theoretically to a public benefit; the direct beneficiary was
135
the mill owner.
The Mill Acts represented a forced subsidy from some property owners (those whose lands were flooded) to others (those who did the flooding
pursuant to their economically desirable activities). A similar situation
existed with respect to outright takings of land through eminent domain,
many of which continued to be uncompensated well into the nineteenth
century. 136 In 1800, only three states had constitutional requirements of just
131. See Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 16-17 (1884). The Head Court stated,
General mill acts exist in a great majority of the States of the Union. Such acts, authorizing
lands to be taken or flowed in invitum, for the erection and maintenance of mills, existed in
Virginia, Maryland, Delaware and North Carolina, as well as in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, before the Declaration of Independence; and exist at this day in each
of these States, except Maryland, where they were repealed in 1832. One passed in North
Carolina in 1777 has remained upon the statute book of Tennessee. They were enacted in
Maine, Kentucky, Missouri and Arkansas, soon after their admission into the Union. They
were passed in Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Nebraska, Minnesota, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida, while they were yet Territories, and reenacted after they became
States. They were also enacted in Pennsylvania in 1803, in Connecticut in 1864, and more recently in Vermont, Kansas, Oregon, West Virginia and Georgia, but were afterwards repealed
in Georgia.
Id.
132. See, NOVAK, supra note 88, at 2.
133. See HORWITZ, supra note 125, at 30.
134. Id. at 48.
135. This is not to say that the ideology that made such legislation possible was not concerned with
the common or public good. As Professor Novak has observed, one of the key tenets underlying earlynineteenth-century regulation of private property was "an overriding concern with common, rather than
private goods and interests." Novak, supra note 119, at 1083. 1 mean only to highlight the fact that the
more tangible and immediate benefit was to the individual mill owner rather than to the public at large.
136. HORWITZ, supra note 125, at 65.
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compensation for takings of property. 137 Although the movement toward
state constitutional amendments requiring compensation for takings grew
throughout the century, so did a countervailing movement that sought to
construe the requirement of compensation as narrowly as possible. 138 The
uncompensated takings, or takings subject to limited compensation, were
similar to the Mill Acts in that private individuals, through the loss of their
property for less than its value, were essentially forced to subsidize legisla139
tively-determined government ends.
The economic aspect of these legal regimes, the realization of public
goals through forced subsidies levied against the private property of specific individuals (in the case of eminent domain) or classes of individuals
(in the case of the Mill Acts), should not obscure the ideological framework
that made these actions acceptable in the eyes of the citizenry. As Horwitz
argues, the tendency toward limitation of the compensation requirement
"drew upon a surprisingly widespread and powerful earlier view that all
property was originally held at the sufferance of the sovereign." 140 This
ideology-the primacy of the sovereign power of the state over the individual interests of private property owners-is consonant with the overarching ideology of regulation that Novak has identified: the general
welfare, determined through the representative legislative process, gave the
state a powerful claim to legitimacy when it regulated and interfered14 1
sometimes drastically-with private property.
To summarize, the relationship between private property and the states
in the early nineteenth century involve two overarching characteristics.
First is the superiority accorded to the prerogatives of government, acting
in furtherance of the general welfare of society, over purely private interests in property. Second is the use of laws promulgated by representative
legislatures as an instrumentality of social change. State legislatures,
through Mill Acts and un- or under-compensated eminent domain takings,
took an active role in distributing the benefits and burdens associated with
137. Vermont, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. Id. at 64.
138. Seeid. at65.
139. It should be noted that, whereas the state actually took title to land obtained through eminent
domain, it does not appear that the mill owner who benefited from a Mill Act obtained any sort of
property interest in the flooding of his neighbor's lands. (For example, the owner of the flooded land
could erect a dike in order to hold back his neighbor's water without (legal) repercussions.) The effect
of the Mill Acts was merely to limit the liability of the mill owner to the owner of the flooded land for
the loss of value caused by the water's presence. For this reason, the effect of the Mill Act is best
described in economic terms as a subsidy from the flooded land owner to the mill owner. For a nineteenth-century discussion of the distinction between the effect of an eminent domain taking and a Mill
Act, see Murdock v. Stickney, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 113, 114, 116-19 (1851).
140. HORWITZ, supra note 125, at 66.
141. See NOVAK, supranote 88, at 1.
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achieving public benefits. In so doing, they defined and redefined the parameters of the terms "property" and "ownership," which were not at all
fixed Platonic categories, but rather were constructs contingent on representative determinations of the public welfare.
Consequently, just as the Court's historical discourse in Kelo 142 and
Lucas 14 3 failed to find historical grounding in the Colonial period, the historical discourse similarly fails to find a historical basis in the early nineteenth century. As in the Colonial period, private property was liable to be
taken in furtherance of legislatively-determined public purposes. Beyond
this, private property was subject to regulation-brought about by a new
conception of law as an instrument of social change-that actually altered
the content of private property ownership as a concept. 144 Property was, in
early American practice, very much a construct of positive law that could
be redefined in important ways by lawmakers, rather than the natural, prepolitical concept that commentators such as Richard Epstein have inferred
based on Locke's philosophical influence on many revolutionary think5
ers. 14
B.

The "HistoricalCompact" of the Takings Clause

Neither the practices of the Colonial era nor those of the decades immediately following the ratification of the Constitution suggest a widely
held, popular understanding of private property as sacrosanct and privileged against governmental regulation or other interventions. Notwithstanding the distinctly non-Blackstonian conception of property that was
manifest in the exercise of governmental power over private property at the
state level, the question remains whether the nation made an ideological
commitment to such a conception when it adopted the Takings Clause as
part of its fundamental law. If this were the case, then there would be a
separate historical basis-a freestanding statement of first principles-for
the arguments of Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas that early Ameri-

142. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
143. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
144. This seriously undermines the workability of the approach that the Court embraced in Lucas,
in which regulations prohibiting all economically beneficial use of property either are or are not takings
depending on whether the uses they prohibit would be considered nuisances under the "background
principle" of property. See id. at 1030. The history of the Colonial period and the early nineteenth
century illustrates that the "background principles" varied widely and were subject to change; this
makes it difficult to find a static baseline of background law against which to measure regulations on
property.
145. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 29.
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can ideology embraced a limited view of the powers of government over
46

private property. 1

The history of the Takings Clause, however, simply does not support
an argument that the Takings Clause embodies a commitment of the highest ideological order to a broad, substantive protection of private property
against governmental interventions of whatever kind-a constitutional
embodiment of Blackstonian property ideology. The story of the Takings
Clause's promulgation and its later application indicates that its range of
application was quite narrow: it was intended as a safeguard against naked
expropriation or destruction of private property at the national level; it was
intended as a protection against large-scale punitive or redistributive
schemes emerging from the class conflict that James Madison foresaw
14 7
between those who owned property and those who did not.
1. The Takings Clause in Historical Context
The era that began with the outbreak of the Revolutionary War was a
tumultuous period. Many states, driven by economic exigencies, class hostilities, and patriotic motivations, passed laws which had the effect of destroying or widely redistributing private property interests. 148 Among the
most drastic of these legislative interventions in the sphere of private property were divestment acts and bills of attainder confiscating the property of
citizens who remained loyal to the Crown; also drastic were statutes intended to relieve debtors by providing for the issuance of worthless paper
money while requiring creditors to accept the valueless currency for the
payment of debts (which had the effect of destroying the property interest
49
in debts that creditors were owed). 1
The movement to replace the Articles of Confederation with a fundamental law that would provide for a stronger centralized government was in
large part motivated by the desire to create a government capable of protecting property. 150 The new government was designed to achieve this end
by curtailing the perceived excesses embodied in the confiscatory and redistributive legislative schemes being enacted by the states. 15 1 Thus, the
Framers sought to create a "more vigorous national government that could
protect property rights, promote commerce, establish credit by paying the
146.
senting);
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

disSee Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671-77 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2677-87 (Thomas, J.,
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-30.
See discussion infra Part I1.B. 1.
See Treanor, supra note 2, at 790.
See NEDELSKY, supra note 94 at 22-23; Treanor, supra note 2, at 790.
See ELY, supranote 103, at 42; NEDELSKY, supra note. 94, at 22-23.
NEDELSKY, supra note 94, at 24-25.
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public debt, and suppress insurrection." 152 They built numerous restrictions
into the Constitution that were intended to prevent states from enacting
legislation that would have redistributive or confiscatory consequences for
private property.153 The prohibitions on state enactment of bills of attainder
and import and export taxes, the prohibition on the issuance of paper
money, and the Contracts Clause (which prohibited state legislation "impairing the obligation of contracts"), are all manifestations of this con1 54
cern.
The Framers were undeniably concerned with establishing fundamental constitutional limitations on the power of state governments to interfere
with private property interests. However, the historical record also shows
that none of the Framers publicly argued for imposing anything like the
limitation that would eventually become the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause on the states by incorporating it into the Constitution in 1787 along
with the prohibitions on bills of attainder, import and export taxes, paper
money, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts. 155 Furthermore, in
the amendment process that led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, no
state petitioned Congress to adopt a just compensation provision. 156
Thus, the intent underlying the proposal that led to the Takings Clause
is rather mysterious, as is the understanding of those who debated and ratified it as part of the Fifth Amendment. As Michael W. McConnell has
noted, there is no written or spoken explanation by James Madison on record as to why he proposed what became the Takings Clause along with his
other draft amendments in June 1789.157 The preoccupation of the Framers
with curtailing state legislation that destroyed or redistributed private property interests does not seem to explain the motivation for a restriction that
applied, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, to the federal government
alone. 158 Because the Takings Clause "was one of the least controversial
provisions in the Bill of Rights, occasioning no recorded substantive com-

152. ELY, supra note 103, at 42.
153. See id. at 43-45.
154. See id.
155. Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and ConstitutionalStructure, 76 CAL. L. REV. 267, 282 (1988).
156. Id.at 282-83.
157. Id.
at 283.
158. Professor Treanor has suggested that Madison may have intended that the Takings Clause,
while legally restricting only federal action, would have an educative effect, influencing state-level
action upon private property. William Michael Treanor, The Origins and OriginalSignificance of the
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 710-11 (1985).
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ment at all," conclusions about what the clause was intended to do, or why
it was adopted, are difficult to reach. 159
There is, however, some circumstantial evidence of Madison's intent
that suggests that his concern was with preventing large-scale property
redistribution or confiscation on a national level by legislative majorities.
Jennifer Nedelsky, who has provided significant insights into Madison's
property ideology, argues that one of the most troubling aspects of the preconstitutional era for Madison was the way in which states had interfered
with private property interests through the issuance of paper money and
debtor relief laws that compelled creditors to accept the worthless currency
as payment for debts. 160 She argues that Madison saw in these laws an
embodiment of the potential for tyranny by a majority in a republican system: "In Madison's eyes the popular attacks on property became proof that
a majority as well as a minority could pursue injustice, violate individual
rights, and undermine the public good."' 16 1 In a sense, these legislative
measures stood for a broader risk that Madison felt was inherent in a republic whose basic principle was representative democracy: "[P]roperty would
always be at risk in a republic because it would always be vulnerable to the
dissatisfaction of the (inevitable) propertyless majority; and the vulnerability of property rights revealed the nature of the republican threat to individ1 62
ual rights, oppression by the majority."'
Another possible explanation for the appearance of the Takings Clause
as a limitation on the prerogatives of the federal government was proposed
by St. George Tucker 16 3 in his 1803 edition of Blackstone's Commentaries,
which was the first to include additional material explicitly referencing the
Bill of Rights. In Tucker's view, the clause "was probably intended to restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the army,
and other public uses, by impressment, as was too frequently practised
during the revolutionary war." 164 The common theme in both of these explanations is a concern with the possibility of national governmental action
driven by legislative majorities, motivated by antagonisms between broad
classes of citizens (propertyless vs. propertied; patriots vs. Tories) that
would bring about the total destruction or redistribution of private property
159. McConnell, supranote 155, at 283.
160. See NEDELSKY, supra note 94, at 22-23.
161. Id. at 23.
162. Id. at 25.
163. St. George Tucker was Professor of Law at the College of William and Mary beginning in
1790. His edition of Blackstone's commentaries was completed in 1794, but difficulty in finding a
publisher delayed the publication of the work until 1803. Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1996).

164. Treanor, supra note 2, at 791-92 (citation omitted).
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interests. In other words, Madison was concerned about mass appropriation
or redistribution of property at the national level in which the entirety of a
private property interest was extinguished. 165 This would explain why there
was no widespread outcry for a Takings Clause in the first place, and why
it was not the subject of substantive debate: it was a provision that applied
only to a very small class of potential situations-federal activities effecting wholesale destruction or appropriation of private property intereststhat seemed unlikely to occur because of the very size and structure of the
federal government.
Admittedly, the historical evidence of the original intent underlying
the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause is sparse. 166 That in itself would
seem to indicate that the "historical compact" invoked by Justice Scalia in
his opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council167 did not include
the strong, substantive protection of private property against a broad range
of governmental interferences. Furthermore, the evidence of original intent
that does exist points to a preoccupation-arguably arising out of state
legislative actions, but not dealing with them directly-with preempting a
specific class of legislation: total, uncompensated destruction or appropriation of private property interests by the federal government. None of the
historical evidence suggests, as the Court's recent historical discourse on
takings argues, that the Takings Clause was understood or intended to apply to anything less than total physical takings of private property interests
(in the case of appropriation, as Tucker would have it)168 or the complete
extinction of intangible property interests (in the case of the debtor relief
laws). 169 Nothing suggests that regulation or other action leading to a dimi165. See NEDELSKY, supra note 94, at 22-28 (describing the tensions between Madison's belief in
a republican form of government and his concern that purely majoritarian government would threaten
private property and lead to anarchy).
166. Further interpretive problems arise from the fact that the evidence that is available comes
largely from Madison himself, rather than the other Framers or the conventions that actually ratified the
amendments. The multiplicity of actors responsible for the Constitution and its amendments makes
arguments about "original intent" difficult, to say the least. In this spirit, Larry Kramer has written:
To treat the intent of the Framers as authoritative is like relying on the understanding of the
law clerk who drafted an opinion, the speech writer who wrote the President's State of the
Union Address, or the lobbyist who was solicited by a member of Congress to formulate proposed legislation. Theirs are not the lawmaking voices.
Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627, 1644 (1997).
167. 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992).
168. See supratext accompanying note 164.
169. This is a broader range of application than Professor Treanor finds in the "original" Takings
Clause when he writes that Madison believed that compensation was required for physical takings but
not for regulations. See Treanor, supra note 2, at 839. Rather than drawing a distinction between compensated physical takings and uncompensated regulations, I believe that Professor Nedelsky's evidence
of Madison's intent compels the conclusion that Madison intended for all total deprivations of property-whether through physical taking or regulation-to be compensated, while regulations which
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nution in the value of private property was contemplated as falling under
the Takings Clause, nor that any substantive definition of the legitimate
public purposes which would enable government interference with private
property was intended.
2.

The Contracts Clause as the Primary Protection of Private Property

This essay argues that the Takings Clause was not understood at the
time of its adoption to contain a powerful, substantive protection of private
property rights. First, the clause applied only to the federal government,
while the states were the prime source of governmental interference with
private property. Second, it appears that the Takings Clause applied only to
the total appropriation or destruction of private property interests. Consequently, the clause did not provide any substantive definition of property
rights: whatever "property" was, the clause only applied if the totality was
taken, as in the case of a physical occupation or expropriation of land.
Lesser intrusions do not appear to have been contemplated as falling under
the Takings Clause. 170 This understanding is buttressed by judicial interpretations of the Takings Clause in antebellum America, which were summarized in an 1857 treatise by Theodore Sedgwick: "It seems to be settled
that, to entitle the owner to protection under this clause, the property must
171
actually be taken in the physical sense of the word ....,,

The relatively limited scope of the Takings Clause did not mean that
private property interests were left unprotected from state-level action.
Rather, in the first half of the nineteenth century, these interests were protected from state action by the Contracts Clause, which prohibited the
states from enacting laws "impairing the obligation of contracts." 1 72 The
Supreme Court, in a series of landmark cases, chose to protect private
property from state interference under the Contracts Clause rather than the
Takings Clause, even in cases where the governmental action was more
merely limited use or diminished values would be uncompensated. See NEDELSKY, supra note 94, at
22-28.
170. In a detailed, well-reasoned essay, Andrew S. Gold has argued that the original understanding
of the Takings Clause encompassed indirect takings (through legislation that destroyed a property
interest) as well as direct physical takings. However, he does not seem to argue that indirect "regulatory" takings that took less than the entire property interest were believed to require compensation. See
Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis "Goes
too Far",49 AM. U. L. REV. 181 (1999).
171. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 519-20 (New York, John S. Voorhies

1857), quoted in Treanor, supra note 2, at 792.
172. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 10. For a discussion of the history and present problems in interpretation
of the Contracts Clause, see Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 703 (1984).
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readily characterized as a taking of property than an interference with the
obligation of a contract. 173 This essay contends that this non-obvious
choice to apply one constitutional protection-the Contracts Clause-to
state interferences with private property, while limiting the application of
another constitutional protection-the Takings Clause-to federal interferences involving total appropriations of private property reflects an understanding that the federal government could not define the content of the
category "private property rights" because such definition was squarely
within the exclusive province of the individual states. 174
The first case in the development of this constitutional doctrine was
Fletcher v. Peck, in which the Supreme Court was called upon to decide the
constitutionality of an act by the Georgia state legislature that repealed an
earlier land grant because the grant had been procured by bribing the previous legislature.1 75 In principle, this action would seem to fit most naturally
under the rubric of an uncompensated taking of property from the original
grantees. In 1810, when the case was decided, there was no Supreme Court
precedent to the effect that the Takings Clause only applied to the federal
government. 176 Consequently, the Court's opinion, written by Chief Justice
Marshall, in theory could have invalidated the repeal on Fifth Amendment
grounds. Rather than apply the Takings Clause, however, the Court held
that, because the grant of land was a contract that implied that the grantor
(the state of Georgia) would not retake the property granted, the repeal of
the grants was invalid under the Contracts Clause because the repeal impaired the state's own contractual obligation to the grantees. 177 The governmental interference was unconstitutional not because it abrogated some
general right against the world inherent in property ownership, but because
it destroyed the specific contract-based rights of the original grantees as
against the state of Georgia.
A similar situation presented itself in the celebrated case of Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward.17 8 Dartmouth College, a private institu173. See cases cited supra note 98. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's property jurisprudence
under Chief Justice John Marshall, see James W. Ely, Jr., The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A
Reappraisal,33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023 (2000).
174. It is interesting to note that, even as late as the Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon in 1922, the Court seems to contemplate the challenged land-use regulation as potentially barred
by the Contracts Clause. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, writes that "obviously the implied
limitation [that private property is subject to government regulation] must have its limits or the contract
and due process clauses are gone." 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (emphasis added).
175. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 87-91 (1810).
176. The Court would make this determination in 1833, in Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
177. See Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 136-37, 139.
178. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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tion, had been established by royal charter in 1769.179 In 1816, the New
Hampshire state legislature essentially attempted to convert it into a public
school by statutorily amending its corporate charter to increase the number
of trustees and authorizing the governor to fill the newly-created spaces
with his own appointees. 180 As David P. Currie has argued, "The essence
of the transaction, it seems, was an uncompensated taking.' 18 ' Yet the
Court, led by Justice Marshall, based its finding of unconstitutionality on
the Contracts Clause, arguing not that the uncompensated legislative conversion of private property to a public use violated some generally applicable definition of property rights, but rather that the action by the New
Hampshire legislature was unconstitutional because it impaired the specific
rights and obligations created by the contract-the charter-under which
182
the College had been formed.
A final case in this line is Sturges v. Crowninshield.183 Unlike the previous cases, Sturges did not involve an appropriation of private property by
the state, but rather it involved a state law that extinguished private property in the form of debt. 184 The New York legislature had enacted a law
allowing state courts to discharge the obligations of debtors once the debtors had surrendered their property in accordance with a procedure established in the statute. 18 5 The practical effect of this statute was to destroy the
property interests of creditors in the amount of debt that remained to be
paid above and beyond the value of the debtor's surrendered property. In
other words, the statute had arguably "taken," without compensation, a
portion of the private property of the creditors for the purpose of debtor
relief. Once again, the Court's decision that the statute was unconstitutional
did not rest on takings grounds, but rather on the grounds that the statute
had impaired the specific obligations and rights of individuals created by
186
their contractual relationships, violating the Contracts Clause.
This line of cases illustrates that state interferences with private property interests were not immune from constitutional challenges in the early
nineteenth century. Rather, the relevant constitutional protection for private
property against state interference was the Contracts Clause. As James W.

179. Id. at 626.
180. Id.; see also David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and Congressional
Powers, 1801-1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 905 (1982).

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Currie, supra note 180, at 907.
See Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 650.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
See id. at 128-29.
Id.
See id. at 208.
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Ely has argued, "During Marshall's time as Chief Justice, the Contract
Clause served as the principal vehicle by which the Supreme Court defended property against state infringement."' 187 The question remains, why
did the Court examine state interferences with private property under the
Contracts Clause, finding legislative measures invalid because they transgressed specific rights and duties established pursuant to particular contracts? Why did the court not find them invalid because they transgressed
generally applicable rights associated with the ownership of property? In
other words, what was the reason for protecting property interests as contractual rights rather than protecting property rights qua property rights?
In a federal system of government, the responsibility for defining the
contours and content of basic rights-such as the rights associated with
property ownership-lies with the individual states rather than the federal
government or the federal constitution. 188 The Framers of the Constitution
and the Supreme Court, this essay contends, were constrained by this inherent difference between the powers of the federal and state governments.
One consequence of this distinction between federal and state governments
was the inability to provide, on the federal level, a national definition of the
rights associated with property ownership. State governments, as we have
seen, were quite actively shaping and reshaping the contours of the rights
and remedies inherent in the ownership of private property in the nineteenth century. 189 Each regulation, each Mill Act, subtly altered the extent
of each property owner's rights to possess and use his property, as well as
his remedies against those who interfered with his interests. 190 The federal
government could impose a categorical limitation on "total" takings, because such a limitation was easy to define without specifying the rights
contained in the concept of "property"-a total taking occurred when
whatever interest a private individual possessed was extinguished. Similarly, the Supreme Court could protect property when the rights associated
with that property were defined in a discrete contract with readily ascertainable terms.
What neither the Framers nor the Supreme Court were willing to do
was formulate a definition of "taking" that had as a threshold anything less
than a total appropriation or extinction of a private property interest. To do

187. Ely, supra note 173, at 1029.
188. A plurality of the Court recognized this fact in Board of Regents v. Roth, writing that
"[p]roperty interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law." 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
189. See discussion supra Part lI.A.2.
190. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.

20061

HISTOR Y IN TAKINGS CLA USE JURISPRUDENCE

so would have required that they identify some rights associated with property ownership as essential, such that interference with those rights, while
falling short of a complete extinction of a private interest in property,
would constitute a taking. Neither could the early Supreme Court, consistently with the principles of the federal system, assess state interferences
with private property interests in terms of a generalized idea of what it
meant to own property.19 1 As a result, the Court employed the Contracts
Clause to identify property interests that were defined by the terms of discrete contracts in order to avoid imposing a definition of the essential characteristics of property ownership on the states. The totality of the
circumstances surrounding state interferences with private property interests in early America-the actual practice on the ground, the very limited
scope of the Takings Clause, the Supreme Court's decision to apply the
Contracts Clause rather than the Takings Clause-indicates that the states
possessed and used significant power to define and regulate private interests in property in early American society.
The purpose of this Section has been to interrogate the historical foundation of the cluster of historical claims about private property and governmental power in America that comprise what this essay calls the
static/preemptive discourse in the Supreme Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence. This Section shows that the documented history does not support
these claims, which are superficial, if not facile, representations of what is
actually a rich and complicated record. Rather, the historical discourse of
Lucas192 and Kelo1 93 is an example of a well-established discursive tradition in American legal culture: the tradition of "law office history," which
is characterized not by an intellectually honest attempt to examine the past,
but "a stark, crabbed, oversimplified picture of the past, developed largely
to plead a case." 194 The ramifications of this "law office history" in the
191. Indeed, even in Swift v. Tyson (in which the Court held that federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction could use federal common law as a rule of decision in matters of "general" law rather than
state decisional law) the Court carved out a special place for property law, which it saw as so intimately
bound up with a specific jurisdiction as to constitute "local" rather than "general" law:
In all the various cases which have hitherto come before us for decision, this Court have uniformly supposed, that the true interpretation of the thirty-fourth section limited its application
to state laws strictly local, that is to say, to the positive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable and
intraterritorial in their nature and character.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
192. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
193. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
194. Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, in ESSAYS ON THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 77, 80 (Gottfried Dietze ed., 1964), quoted in John Phillip Reid, Law and
History, 27 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 193, 197 (1993).
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specific context of recent takings controversies is the focus of the next Section.
III. HISTORY, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM, AND THE GOALS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION

The historical claims that form the basis for the Court's interpretations
of the Takings Clause in Lucas and the Kelo dissents are unsupported by
the available historical evidence of early American practices, as well as the
Takings Clause itself as it was proposed and ratified and as it was interpreted by the Marshall Court. 195 Beyond examining the historical inaccuracy of these claims, this Section makes a few observations about why this
use of history is particularly troublesome in the context of the Supreme
Court's constitutional jurisprudence. This concluding Section argues that
when the Court uses one-dimensional history to interpret the Takings
Clause, there are at least two undesirable results. First, significant departures from preexisting doctrine may be obscured by an appearance of fidelity to historical norms. Second, by taking a reductive view of history, the
Court fails to perform one of its essential functions: to explore with intellectual rigor the relationship between present-day societal norms and desires and the historical norms expressed in constitutional doctrine as it has
evolved over two centuries.
A.

JudicialActivism as "Fidelity" to History

To begin this examination of the negative ramifications of the Lucas/Kelo historical discourse, it is useful to contemplate the consequences
of the Court's decision in Lucas as well as the consequences of the positions advocated in the Kelo dissents, had they won the support of a majority
of the Court. As a result of Lucas, private property ownersnotwithstanding any state common law, custom, or enactment to the contrary19 6-gained a substantive right to be free from state legislation that
deprives them of all economically beneficial use of their land, unless their
proposed use would be enjoinable as a nuisance at common law. 197 As
Professor Michelman observed, the Lucas decision, by creating a substantive property right on the federal level, "nationalize[d] some aspects of the

195. See discussion supra Part II.
196. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. The United States Constitution, and by extension, its authoritative
interpretation by the Supreme Court, is the "supreme Law of the Land ...any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding."
197. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-32.
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law of property."1 98 In doing so, the Court drastically departed from the
traditional conception of "bodies of property law maintained by the several
States,"' 19 9 as well as from the Court's long-held position, articulated in
Board of Regents v. Roth, that property interests are not created at the federal/constitutional level, but rather "are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law."'2 00 Justice Scalia's positing of this substantive
property right, which became in essence a federal common law of property,
makes Lucas a landmark case for its departure not only from Takings
Clause precedent, but from the Court's general understanding of whence
property law originates and the different powers of the federal and state
20 1
governments.
The positions articulated in the Kelo dissents are perhaps more stunning, notwithstanding the fact that they failed to become law. Justice
O'Connor's dissent, informed by her understanding of the history of private
property rights and governmental power, would limit the states' eminent
domain power to situations where "the extraordinary, precondemnation use
of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on society. '202 The effect of this rule, were it to become law, would be to prohibit state interventions in private property that are intended to promote or maintain higher
levels of economically beneficial property use. These are precisely the
types of interventions that have long historical precedent-as in the nineteenth century Mill Acts discussed above 203-and have been upheld in
previous Supreme Court cases, such as the landmark preservation regulations upheld in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York.20 4
Even more drastically, Justice Thomas's dissent would enforce a
strictly literal interpretation of the Takings Clause, informed by Justice
Thomas's understanding that the Fifth Amendment was intended to incorporate a Blackstonian property ideology into the Constitution. 205 Had Justice Thomas, and his historical arguments, persuaded a majority of the
198. Michelman, supra note 60, at 304.
199. Id. at 309-10.
200. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
201. The categorical rule announced in Lucas (that regulations that deny a private property owner
all economic benefit from her property constitute a taking unless the prohibited use would be enjoinable
under traditional common-law doctrines) implies that the right to benefit economically from property is
inherent and essential to ownership in any U.S. jurisdiction. Such a rule seems inconsistent with the
Court's ruling in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, in which the Court rejected the idea that the federal
courts were competent to expound a federal "general" common law. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938),
202. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2674 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
203. See supranotes 127, 131, 139 and accompanying text.
204. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
205. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Court, the new rule on takings would be that "the government may take
property only if it actually uses or gives the public a legal right to use the
property." 20 6 This rule would invalidate exercises of state power that have
been practiced continuously since colonial times, and it would overrule an
unbroken line of cases interpreting the Takings Clause requirement of
"public use" to mean "public purpose" as defined by the legislature that
dates back to 1896.207

The purpose of examining the actual or potential changes wrought by
these opinions is to illustrate that each opinion deploys "law office history"
in a way that would bring about major departures from traditional practices
and Supreme Court precedent. This decision on the part of certain Justices
to make a major departure from tradition and precedent in order to give
effect to a normatively "better" policy is easily characterized as judicial
activism, if that term is defined as the refusal to defer to tradition and
precedent. 208 The historical arguments marshaled by Justices Scalia,
O'Connor, and Thomas are the major premise in the syllogism by which
they arrive at radical results: a substantive property right protected by a
federal common law of property; a categorical ban on state interventions
with private property for the purpose of maximizing economically beneficial use; a requirement that the eminent domain power be used only when
the public will actually have the right to use condemned property.
By presenting their decisions as being determined by fidelity to "historical" understandings, however, the Justices minimize the appearance of
activism and efface both their own roles as judicial decision-makers and the
role of normative or policy commitments as ideological factors leading to
their conclusions. The Lucas/Kelo discourse, based on what is at best a
reductive, one-dimensional interpretation of historical American property
law and ideology, functions as a rhetorical device to give the impression
that the Justices' decisions are merely parts of an unbroken chain that
stretches across the whole of American history, rather than radical departures from practice and precedent. In this way, fidelity to history (and an
illusory history at that) obscures the radical, activist posture of the rule that
is argued for, confirming Professor Reid's argument that "[h]istory's great
attractiveness for judges occurs when they are indulging in judicial activ206. Id. at 2686.
207. Justice Thomas's dissent frankly acknowledges that "the 'public purpose' interpretation of the
Public Use Clause stems from Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley." Id. at 2683 (citing Fallbrook
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161-62 (1896)).
208. See Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism, 66 JUDICATURE 236,
241 (1983) (listing interpretive stability, "the degree to which a Supreme Court decision either retains
or abandons precedent or existing judicial doctrine," as a measure ofjudicial activism).
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ism. History lets them be activists in the name of constitutional continuity." 2 09
Whether or not it is true that, as Joseph Singer once wrote, "[w]e are
all legal realists now, ' 2 10 it seems clear that judicial decision-makersparticularly when calling for a major departure from traditional practice or
precedent--cannot legitimately make their case entirely by claiming fidelity to a history that has little basis in fact. Whether or not the results that
Justice Scalia (in Lucas) or Justices O'Connor and Thomas (dissenting in
Kelo) argue for are normatively desirable or represent good policy is not
the issue. Rather, the issue is that it behooves the Court and ultimately the
nation as a whole to have the normative or policy-based underpinnings of
these opinions presented overtly rather than using a putative historical understanding with very little in the way of factual support as a proxy for
present-day normative commitments. History has much to recommend it as
an aid-perhaps an essential one 21 1-in legal interpretation, but not when it
is flattened to one dimension and used to obscure the bases on which deci2 12
sions are being made.
This, then, is the first danger associated with law office history in general, and the static/preemptive discourse in Takings Clause law specifically: superficial, reductive historical claims become a rhetorical tool that
allows the judicial decision-maker to obscure the contingent, normative
determinations underlying legal conclusions by presenting the conclusion
as a mere continuation of a historical tradition. The judge/author denies
responsibility for her own choices, while at the same time legitimating
them by placing them within a validating historical context. This tendency
to veil normative judgments and substantive value choices as a passive
application of historical norms must be opposed. Irrespective of their ideological predispositions with regard to private property, the people who have
a stake in this argument are all who believe that actors in republican legal/political institutions need to labor toward consensus by developing "a
language capable of both expressing and disciplining our normative com-

209. Reid, supra note 194, at 204 (internal quotations omitted).
210. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 465,467 (1988) (book review).
211. See Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. Rev. 1
(1998) (arguing that history is essential to Constitutional interpretation).
212. Christopher L. Eisgruber has argued that "there is too much history in constitutional interpretation." Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: History and ConstinaionalJustice, 65
FORDHAM L. REv. 1611, 1622 (1997). He seems, however, to conflate all history with the "originalist"
rhetorical tactic of using history to "authenticate" or "legitimate" judicial decisions. Id. at 1622-23. 1
see a greater range of uses for history in constitutional interpretation, and consequently, a need for more
history, done properly, rather than less.
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mitments, a language that allows us... to understand alternative social
'213
visions and to judge them.
The historical discourse of Lucas and the Kelo dissents is not such a
language. As Professor Singer has argued, "Our goal should be to generate
competing visions of social justice ...[and] to engage in a democratic
process of mutual persuasion in light of our disparate visions. '2 14 This
applies to the Court, as a paramount institution of our nation, no less than
the academy, and it must begin with a commitment to articulating openly
the judgments and choices that underlie legal decisions.
B.

The Dangerof One-DimensionalHistory as an Interpretive Tool

To return briefly to the cases discussed in Section I, a second regularity appears among the opinions identified as examples of the Court's traditional historical discourse-Euclid,2 15 Penn Central,2 16 and Midkiff 17and the Lucas/Kelo discourse. In Euclid, Penn Central,and Midkiff history
is deployed to contextualize the judgments of state/local legislative bodies
about what type of governmental interference with private property is both
desirable and permissible. 2 18 The role of history in these cases is to portray
the perceived needs and desires of contemporary society, as reflected in
determinations of public policy by representative bodies, as rational responses to changed material circumstances and evolving societal mores. By
contrast, history is invoked in Lucas and the Kelo dissents to delegitimate
contemporary public aspirations by representing them as manifestly opposed to fundamental historical norms of American society. 2 19 Just as the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 220 establishes federal law as preempting conflicting state laws, the static/preemptive historical discourse
posits its historical norms as a reason-preempting check on contemporary
societal policies that deviate from the putative original or authentic American understanding of the relationship between private property and governmental power.

213. Singer, supra note 210, at 543.
214. Id.
215. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
216. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
217. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
218. See id. at 231-33; Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 107-09; Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386-87.
219. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2671-77 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at
2677-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992).
220. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S.
CONST. art. VI.
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Nietzsche once wrote that "[w]e want to serve history only to the extent that history serves living."'2 21 A more contemporary and less sweeping
articulation of this basic insight as it applies to the specifically legal sphere
is David A.J. Richards's assertion that "the task of legal interpretation is
faithfully to account for a community's self-consciously historical understanding of itself as a legal tradition. '222 Each of these formulations implies
that the orientation of legal-historical claims in legal interpretation should
be forward-looking: history should be used to explain and understand the
present perceived needs or desires of the community by reference to the
past, faithfully acknowledging both continuities and discontinuities in ideologies and practices, rather than privileging the one moment or era in the
past over the present and using ossified "historical understandings" to delegitimate the present. History need not be "controlling," but we should not
depart from our historical commitments without an awareness that we are
doing so.
What is needed is an inclusive history, in which not just the Founding,
or early America, but all eras of relevant material and ideological change
are mobilized in order to "reconcile our deepest constitutional commitments, revealed by all of our constitutional history, with today's preferences. '223 In this way, the Court can work to reconcile the facticity of
contemporary aspirations as expressed in the pieces of positive law that it
subjects to constitutional review, with the normative commitments expressed in the Constitution itself-what Larry Kramer has termed "the
tension... between practice and theory, [the] 'is' and [the] 'ought"' inherent in constitutional interpretation. 224
This sensitive, inclusive approach is especially desirable in the context
of the government/property interface generally, and the Takings Clause
specifically, the history of which (as argued in Section II) does not lend
itself at all to the discovery of an historical urform with respect to which
we can classify any current practice as either a continuation or a deviation. 22 5 The historical record reveals a balance between private property
interests and governmental prerogatives that has been in a state of continual
flux as competing ideologies as well as material circumstances caused

221. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, in UNTIMELY
MEDITATIONS 57, 59 (R.J. Hollingdale trans. 1983) (1874).
222. David A.J. Richards, Interpretationand Historiography,58 S. CAL. L. REv. 489, 500 (1985).
223. Friedman & Smith, supra note 211, at 7.
224. Kramer, supra note 166, at 1638.

225. As Professor Alexander concisely states, "There is no single American traditional meaning of
property in American legal thought." ALEXANDER, supra note 49, at 7.
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lawmakers, judges, and ordinary citizens to draw the boundaries differently
in different times and different places.
Given the protean nature of private property rights throughout American history, and the overdetermined quality of the balance between private
property and governmental power in any given time and place, the furthest
we can honestly take historical arguments about the government/property
interface is to try to contextualize present understandings and initiatives by
reference to relevant aspects of a complex, polyvalent historical record.
This describes the historical discourse that the Court has traditionally employed in cases like Euclid, Penn Central,and Midkiff emphasizing history
as a dynamic force, using a narrative of historical change to render contemporary interpretations of governmental power over private property legible
in terms of the past.
The Lucas/Kelo discourse, by contrast, commits a double error. First,
it privileges a specific historical moment not only over the present, but over
all relevant intervening moments, as a source of legitimate understandings
of the law. 226 It insists that contemporary interpretations (in the form of
positive law enacted by representative bodies) are only valid insofar as they
recapitulate the static historical understandings it identifies with the Founding and, more generally, early America. This refusal to acknowledge the
fact of material and ideological change over time as relevant to Constitutional interpretation is in direct contradiction to the stance that the Court
took in one of its most developed explorations of the theme of historical
change in Constitutional interpretation, upholding Roe v. Wade227 in
PlannedParenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.22 8 Second, it
collapses the diverse practices and ideologies that characterize the history
of the government/property interface into a monolith, and thereby impoverishes legal history as a resource through which the contemporary community can understand or define itself in relation to the past.
It bears emphasizing once more that the conflict between the Court's
traditional historical discourse on takings and the more recent,
static/reason-preemptive historical discourse is, since Kelo, very much an
226. Thirty years ago, Thomas C. Grey provided a concise but nonetheless chilling catalogue of
generally accepted constitutional principles that would have to be jettisoned if the only source of constitutional law were the text as understood at the time of the Founding. See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have
an Unwritten Constitution?,27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 710-13 (1975).
227. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
228. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The Court in Casey recognized both that "[i]n constitutional adjudication
as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose new obligations," id. at 864, and that, whether
or not the Court's decision in Roe was "right," its incorporation into American constitutional culture
meant that "the certain cost of overruling Roe for people who have ordered their thinking and living
around that case [cannot] be dismissed," id. at 856.
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ongoing issue. Although the Lucas/Kelo discourse has attracted a majority
of the Court only once, in Lucas, it is highly possible that this will change
as new membership, along with new leadership under Chief Justice Roberts, creates the potential for new directions in the Court's Takings Clause
jurisprudence. The outcome of this conflict has significance beyond the
realm of property law; it is as much about how our highest court adjudicates legal disputes, and how we define ourselves as a historically selfconscious society, as it is about legal doctrine. We need to demand intellectual honesty from the Court and defend American history as a rich, complex, polyvalent tradition capable of validating multiple points of view on
the government/property interface. Above all, these factors call for a sustained critical interrogation of the historical discourse in the Supreme
Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence.

